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INTRODUCTION

Planners and environmentalists have long lauded Oregon's unique system
of regulating land use.' For over thirty years, the system had two primary
actors: the legislature, which passed regulations, and the courts, which enforced
them. Legislators and judges worked together to establish laws that preserved
the state's natural environment, promoted smart-growth principles, and
improved urban centers.
While many Oregonians were happy with the laws' results, they became
disillusioned with the state's means of achieving them. In November 2004,
Oregonians asserted themselves as a powerful third actor in the land use debate.
During the election that month, the citizen-sponsored Measure 37 appeared on
the Oregon ballot. The measure was officially titled: "Governments must pay
owners, or forgo enforcement, when certain land-use restrictions reduce
property value." 2 It required that local governments either monetarily
compensate landowners whose properties fall in value as a result of land use
regulations or, under certain conditions, exempt those landowners from the
regulations altogether. 3 Going further than any other state law, Oregon's
the4 state
Measure 37 presented a radical remedy for landowners by preventing
•
from engaging in "regulatory takings" without compensating landowners.
t Columbia Law School, J.D. expected 2006. University of Oxford, M.Sc. 2003. University of
Texas, B.Arch./B.A. 2001. The author wishes to thank Dan Korobkin, Luke Bronin, and Professor
Robert C. Ellickson for their skillful editing.
1. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through
Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 277-78 (2004) (describing Oregon's innovative carbon
dioxide standard and greenhouse gas emissions reduction programs); Edward J. Sullivan, Norman
Williams, Jr. & Bernard H. Siegan, The Oregon Example: A Prospectfor the Nation, 14 ENVTL. L. 843,
851 (1984) (symposium panel discussion, remarks of Norman Williams, Jr.) (applauding Oregon's
"combination of favorable features [as] extraordinary"); Rob Bennett, The Next Big Thing in Green
Building, Nw. CONSTRUCTION, Oct. 2004, at 33 (arguing that Portland's "[t]hirty years of progressive
land use and environmental planning, recycling, alternative transportation investment, and urban
renewal is paying off").
PAMPHLET: STATE MEASURES 103-04 (2004), available at
2. OREGON VOTERS'
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvoll .pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
3. Id. at 103. Note that this Comment uses "local government" to collectively refer to local
governments, special districts, or state agencies that propagate land use regulations.
4. The formulation is radical because, though at least four other states have enacted compensation
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Voters supported Measure 37 by a margin of three to two. 5 Their sentiments
echoed the Supreme Court's formulation of regulatory taking doctrine in

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a

certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."6 At
its core, Measure 37 addressed Oregon voters' concern that-for all the good
the land use system had done-the government had "gone too far" in
prohibiting landowners from using their land as they saw fit.
This Comment examines why Oregon voters took the dramatic step of
passing Measure 37, despite longstanding support for the state's strong
approach to growth control. Although economic and demographic shifts may
have been partly responsible, this Comment argues that the answer is more
straightforward and far less inevitable: the legislature and the courts stopped
listening to the people of Oregon.
I.

How THE LEGISLATURE

AND THE COURTS WENT Too FAR

Oregon's two-actor system did little to protect landowners from regulatory
takings. The legislature set up one of the most far-reaching land use systems of
any state and added more regulations each legislative session, yet failed to give
landowners the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the regime in court. The
courts, working within the legislature's system, rarely limited the legislature's
power, and their inconsistent regulatory takings analysis frustrated landowners.
Moreover, prior to the introduction of Measure 37, the courts struck down
another ballot measure involving regulatory takings. The actions of both the
legislature and the courts furthered the perception that they thwarted the public
will.
A.

The FirstActor: The Legislature Establishes a Far-ReachingLand Use
System
1. Oregon's Land Use System

Oregon's modem land use regime began in 1973, when the legislature

statutes, none goes as far as Measure 37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 70.001 (Harrison 2000) (requiring the
government to compensate for losses that "inordinately burden" property use); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3:3601-:3602 (West Supp. 2003) (requiring the government to compensate for losses in value of
twenty percent or more); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -19 (1999) (requiring the government to
compensate for losses in value of forty percent or more); TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.002(5)(b)(2),
.024 (Vernon 2000) (requiring the government to compensate for losses in value of twenty-five percent
or more or to invalidate the action).
5. See Elections Div., Office of the Sec'y of State (Or.), November 2, 2004, General Election
Abstract of Votes: State Measure 37, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/electios/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (showing that 1,054,589 voted for and 685,079 voted against the measure).
6. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
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passed SB 100. 7 The legislation mandated that each city, county, and regional
agency with planning authority draft, adopt, and enforce comprehensive land
use plans. 8 These comprehensive plans must include both a land use map and a
policy statement and must address, at a minimum, "sewer and water systems,
transportation systems, educational facilities, recreational facilities, and natural
9
resources and air and water quality management programs." Oregon's topdown approach is unique even among the states that have 10required or
plans.
encouraged their local governments to adopt comprehensive
SB 100 also required that local governments' comprehensive plans conform

with statewide planning goals (Goals) that have been approved by a governorappointed,

permanent

statewide

agency,

the

Land

Conservation

and

11

Development Commission (LCDC). The Goals, which now number nineteen,
include citizenship participation, protection of farm lands, development of
urban growth boundaries, conservation of natural resources, and a diversified
economy. 12 The LCDC also reviews local governments' comprehensive plans

both initially and on an ongoing basis to determine whether they comply with
the Goals. 13 When the LCDC approves a local government's comprehensive
14

with the Goals.
plan, it is officially "acknowledging" that the plan complies
This process of acknowledgement is critical to the review of challenged
land use decisions.' 5 In Oregon, the primary body that conducts such reviews is
7. S.B. 100, 1973 Or. Laws 127.
8. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2) (2003).
9. § 197.015(5).
10. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
67-76 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that while some authorities claim half the states compel local governments
to use comprehensive plans, classifying the pertinent state statutes is difficult). Oregon's "plan-as-law"
approach places it among a handful of states, including Florida and Arizona, in which comprehensive
plans achieve dispositive significance with respect to land use regulations and legal actions. See Edward
J. Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning, 36 URB. LAW. 541, 541 (2004) (noting also that the plan-as-law
approach "elevate[s] the plan to the status of an 'impermanent constitution,' in which the plan is the
measure of land use regulations and actions"); see also Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement, and Adaptive
Planningin Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 54 (2005) (arguing that "the vast majority of
states do not currently require [as Oregon does] local governments to adopt comprehensive plans or give
such plans binding legal force").
11. See§§ 197.075,.175-.251(5).
12. See Oregon Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev., Goals: Overview of Goals, at
http://egov.oregon.gov/LCD/goals.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2005); see also Robert Liberty, Planned
Growth: The Oregon Model, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 315 (1998) (describing the Goals'
evolution).
13. See § 197.175(2)(a) (stating that each local government must "[p]repare, adopt, amend and
revise comprehensive plans in compliance with goals approved by the commission"). As the Goals
change, local governments must revise and resubmit their planning efforts. See § 197.646.
14. § 197.015(1) ("'Acknowledgment' means a commission [LCDC] order that certifies that a
comprehensive plan and land use regulations, land use regulation or plan or regulation amendment
complies with the goals."); see § 197.251 (outlining the process by which LCDC reviews
acknowledgment decisions).
15. There are two definitions of "land use decision" in Oregon. The first is statutory. See
§ 197.015(10) (defining "land use decision" to mean "(A) A final decision or determination made by a
local government or special district that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of: (i) The
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the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), a quasi-judicial administrative panel
that was established by the legislature in 1979 and is unique among the states. 16
Before LUBA, Oregon allowed parties to seek review of local land use
decisions in a variety of ways: through writ of review to other circuit courts,
declaratory judgment, or a petition for review to the LCDC. Now, LUBA has
"exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision'' 17 and only
state
8
appellate courts can review its decisions. '
When ruling on a challenged land use decision, LUBA first determines
whether a comprehensive plan has been acknowledged by the LCDC. If the
LCDC has not acknowledged the plan, LUBA determines whether the land use
regulation complies with the Goals. 19 However, if LCDC has acknowledged the
plan, then LUBA reviews any land use regulation in the same jurisdiction for
compliance with that plan. Acknowledgment thus establishes the local
government's comprehensive plan as the legal standard in land use disputes,
rather than a statewide baseline or a judge-devised standard. In this way, the
state legislature has allowed local governments to play a substantial role in both
the regulatory and judicial components of the land use system. Because this
arrangement appears, to the public, to give great deference to local
governments and their comprehensive plans, it has negatively influenced public
20
perception of how the courts enforce land use laws.
Oregon's land use law has not been static since the passage of SB 100.21
The legislature's "inclination has been to add to, rather than revise, the existing
planning legislation." 22 Over time, additional legislation created a liaison
goals; (ii) A comprehensive plan provision; (iii) A land use regulation; or (iv) A new land use
regulation; (B) A final decision or determination of a state agency other than the commission with
respect to which the agency is required to apply the goals; or (C) [certain decisions of county planning
commissions]"). The second is court-defined. See, e.g., Billington v. Polk County, 703 P.2d 232, 235
(Or. 1985) (stating that a land use decision must have "a significant impact on present or future land use
in the area"). A special type of land use decision, also reviewable by the Land Use Board of Appeals, is
a "limited land use decision." See §§ 197.015(12), .825(1).
16. See § 197.810(1) (creating the three-member, governor-appointed LUBA). There is no similar
quasi-judicial administrative panel in other states, though the Florida Chapter of the American Planning
Association chapter has proposed a Land Use Board of Appeals based on the Oregon model. See Fla.
Chapter of the Am. Planning Ass'n, Proposal for a Florida Land Use Board of Appeals, at
http://www.floridaplanning.org/legislative/white_papers/LUBA%20description%2010-3-2003.doc
(adopted Oct. 3, 2003).
17. § 197.825.
18. § 197.850(3)(a). See generally §§ 197.805-.850 (establishing LUBA's procedures, duties, and
authority).
19. See Foland v. Jackson County, 807 P.2d 801, 803 (Or. 1991) (establishing that "a land use
decision made in compliance with an acknowledged plan is ipsofacto in compliance with the goals").
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. But cf Hong N. Huynh, Comment, AdministrativeForces in Oregon'sLand Use Planningand
Washington's Growth Management, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 115, 149 (1997) (arguing that by the
1990s, Oregon had "obtain[ed] some stability and respect in land use planning and growth
management").
22. Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium Marking the Twenty-Fifth
Anniversary of S.B. 100, 77 OR. L. REv. 813, 819 (1998); see also Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603
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committee between the LCDC and local governments, set new standards for
housing, defined LUBA's reach, provided for review of regional planning
efforts, and established priorities for urban growth boundaries. 23 Last session, a
public interest group with thirty years experience in the land use field
monitored a record 240 bills related to land use.24
2. A Failureto ProtectLandowners with JudicialRemedies

Citizens might have accepted the elaborate and ever-changing land use laws
if they had reliable access to remedies for the laws' negative effects. The
legislature, however, thwarted citizens' ability to seek such remedies. The
legislature erected at least three "significant deterrents to full and effective

citizen participation" :25 the reliance on evidence presented below, strict rules
on standing, and the requirement that losing parties pay attorneys' fees. Under
these restrictive rules, and despite a complex regulatory scheme, LUBA issues

only about 180 opinions a year.26
(a) Review of Record Below
27
new evidence.
Unlike traditional courts, LUBA does not usually hear

Rather, it relies primarily on the record created below, and specifically on local
decision. 28
government hearings for public comment on a proposed land use
The legislature has limited LUBA's powers of review, with a few exceptions,
29
to the issues presented at these evidentiary hearings. If an issue is not

P.2d 771, 778 (Or. 1979) (observing that "[s]ince 1973, every session of the legislature has produced
significant legislation dealing with local planning").
23. See § 197.165 (establishing the liaison committee, passed in 1977); §§ 197.295-.314, .475-.490
(setting new standards for housing, passed between 1981 and 1987); § 197.195 (expanding the reach of
LUBA, passed in 1991); § 197.274 (mandating that the framework plans of a governing body for the
Portland region be subject to review, passed in 1993); § 197.298 (stipulating what kind of land may be
included in an urban growth boundary, passed in 1995).
24. See 1000 Friends of Oregon, Land Use Planning Survives Legislative Session, at
http://www.friends.org/issues/2003bills/summary2003.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
25. Sullivan, supra note 22, at 837.
26. Author's calculation is based on the number of opinions issued by LUBA in 2002, 2003, and
2004. See Land Use Board of Appeals, LUBA Opinions and Orders by Year, at
http://luba.state.or.us/opinions.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). But cf Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the
Reviewer: The Impact of the Land Use Board of Appeals on the Oregon Land Use Program, 1979-1999,
36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441, 447 & 447 n.46 (2000) (stating "[o]n average, LUBA considers about 250
case filings per year, of which approximately two-thirds reach the opinion stage"-which would result
in about 166 cases per year).
27. § 197.835(2)(b) (confining LUBA review to the record below, including "any finding of fact of
the local government, special district, or state agency for which there is substantial evidence in the
whole record" except in disputes over procedural irregularities such as standing or unconstitutionality of
the decision).
28. Id.In limited circumstances, there may be multiple hearings, see § 197.763, an evidentiary
hearing may not occur, see § 197.830(3)-(4), or petitioner may raise new issues in a LUBA hearing, see
§ 197.835(4).
29. See § 197.835(3); see also § 197.763(1) ("An issue which may be the basis for an appeal to the

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 23:587, 2005

presented at an evidentiary hearing, it may only rarely be litigated in a suit
challenging a land use decision.
(b) Standing
The second obstacle, related to the first and even more striking, is that only
a citizen who "appeared," orally or in writing, before the local government at
the evidentiary hearing may appeal a land use decision. 30 A landowner's ability
to gain standing on a land use claim, as well as the issues that may be addressed
in his suit, thus depends heavily on his participation at the first stages of
litigation. However, Oregon's feeble laws on required notice impede citizens'
ability to meet the appearance requirement for standing. Local governments
may give notice of the evidentiary hearing as late as twenty days before it takes
place, providing potential litigants only a very short time to review the issues
and prepare to appear. 31 Further, the law only requires local governments to
notify landowners whose property is within one hundred or five hundred feet of
the property (depending on zoning type) involved in the land use decision.32
Both rules disadvantage landowners.
(c) Attorney's Fees
Oregon law creates a third obstacle to landowners challenging regulation: If
a court finds that losing landowners did not have probable cause to believe that
their position was well-founded in the law or in the facts, the landowners must
pay the local government's attorney's fees. 33 This rule may deter frivolous suits
and add to LUBA's much-touted efficiency. 34 However, the rule likely deters
worthy claimants from appealing land use decisions.
B.

The SecondActor: The Courts FurtherFrustrateOregonians

Even if landowners believe their claims are worth litigating, courts'
inconsistent and harsh application of relevant law deters landowners from
seeking relief. Oregon courts have developed a unique method of disposing of
regulatory takings cases, specifically frustrating voters in three ways: first, by
Land Use Board of Appeals shall be raised not later than the close of the record at or following the final
evidentiary hearing on the proposal before the local government.").
30. § 197.830(2)(b).
31. § 197.763(3)(f)(A).
32. § 197.763(2)(a)(A)-(C).
33. § 197.830(15). See Fetchig v. City of Albany, 946 P.2d 280, 283 (Or. App. 1997) (stating that
attorneys' fees would be awarded under the probable cause prong if "no reasonable lawyer would
conclude that any of the legal points asserted on appeal possessed legal merit").
34. See Sullivan, supra note 26, at 499-501; Sullivan, Williams & Siegan, supra note 1, at 845
(symposium panel discussion, remarks of Edward J. Sullivan).
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deferring to land use regulations; second, by applying takings analysis
inconsistently; and third, by striking down a ballot initiative addressing
regulatory takings in 2000.
1. Deference to Land Use Regulations
First, in accordance with the acknowledgement process, state courts
generally defer to land-use regulations that are consistent with local
comprehensive plans. 35 Before the legislature enacted SB 100, the Oregon
Supreme Court held that government officials' decisions relating to
comprehensive plans were "quasi-judicial" and did not merit deferential
review. 36 After the passage of SB 100 and the resulting increase of legislative

activity in the land use context, however, Oregon courts held that officials'
decisions were legislative and thus due judicial deference. 37 Courts settled on
this deferential approach at precisely the time when landowners required
greater-not less-protection from excessive regulation. The newer standard,
which favors local governments, has undercut landowners' ability to challenge
land use decisions.
2. Inconsistent Takings Analysis

Oregon courts also apply takings analysis inconsistently, leaving
landowners uncertain about the legal landscape. Under federal constitutional
law, a typical land-use regulation does not constitute a taking,3 8 but in certain
circumstances, a regulation may go so far in regulating property that it will be
recognized as a taking. 39 The Supreme Court has never precisely defined this
standard. 40 However, in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,

the Court laid out a three-factor balancing test, weighing the character of the
challenged regulation, the economic impact of the regulation on the landowner,
and the nature and extent of the regulation's interference with landowners'
35. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
36. Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 29-30 (Or. 1973).
37. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 778 (Or. 1979) (noting that since Fasanowas
decided, "the legislature has taken a very active role in the field of land use regulation"); Norvell v.
Portland Metro. Area Local Gov't Boundary Comm'n, 604 P.2d 866, 899 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (stating
that increasing legislative involvement in the area of land use law implies "the time has come for
Oregon courts to defer more to other branches of government").
38. See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfroggingthe Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 188-89 (1997) (noting that "except in the exceptional instances of physical invasion
or loss of all economic viability, the Supreme Court and lower courts typically reject takings challenges
to government regulation").
39. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
40. See id.at 416 (stating that the diminution of value standard "is a question of degree-and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions"); see also Stewart Sterk, The Federalist
Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 210 (2004) (arguing that with
Mahon's formulation of regulatory takings doctrine, "[g]overnment power to regulate land use had thus
become a matter of degree, generating the doctrinal uncertainty that has endured to the present day").
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"distinct investment-backed expectations.' '4l Confusingly, two years later the
Supreme Court established a slightly different test that included a due process
component: A taking may occur when a regulation fails to substantially
advance legitimate state interests (the due process component), or when it
denies an owner some economically viable use of his land.42 Despite eightythree years of regulatory takings jurisprudence, there are only two
circumstances in which a federal court is sure to find a regulatory taking: per se
cases that involve physical invasions, and situations in which the landowner is
deprived of all economically viable use of the property.43
If federal takings jurisprudence is tangled, state takings law has done little
to clarify the problem. The language of Oregon's state takings clause differs
slightly from its federal counterpart, 44 but the Oregon Supreme Court has failed
to clearly articulate how the state takings clause should be interpreted.
Sometimes the Court suggests that it should be interpreted in exactly the same
way as the federal takings clause, and sometimes it suggests the opposite.4 5
Faced with hopelessly conflicted takings doctrine at both the federal and
state levels, Oregon courts have muddled through regulatory takings cases and
come up with a framework that heavily favors local governments. 46 They

41. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
42. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (setting out both components of takings
analysis).
43. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that "when
the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name
of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking"); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (holding that any physical invasion,
no matter how minor, constitutes a taking). Under Lucas, even landowners who have suffered a ninetyfive percent depreciation in land value may recover nothing under this standard. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020
n.8. For an overview of Supreme Court takings doctrine, see Cordes, supranote 38, at 192-203.
44. Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 18 (providing that "[p]ivate property shall not be taken for
public use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without just compensation; nor except
in the case of the state, without such compensation first assessed and tendered; provided, that the use of
all roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw products of mine or
farm or forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the
state and is declared a public use") with U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
45. Compare GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 900 P.2d 495, 501 n.6 (Or. 1995)
(assuming "without deciding, that the analysis is the same under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon
Constitution, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment") and Cereghino v. State Highway
Comm'n, 370 P.2d 694, 697 (Or. 1962) (stating that "[t]he Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States and Article I, Section 18, of the Oregon Constitution are identical in language and
meaning") with Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 656 P.2d 306, 309 n.5 (Or. 1982) (finding that
"the criteria of compensable 'taking for public use' under art. 1, § 18, are not necessarily identical to
those pronounced from time to time by the United States Supreme Court under the fifth amendment").
46. See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s, 43 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 85, 85-86 (1993) (stating that "the Court handed down more than twenty decisions
in which the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was central" but that a "wellsettled and understandable body of law" had not emerged); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed- Why
the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 562, 566-67 (arguing that courts have
inconsistently applied the "diminution of value" test in part because the test itself was ambiguous as to
the kind and extent of diminution that would trigger compensation).
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dismissed the Penn Central balancing test 4 7 and have declined to use the due
process component, in part because Oregon's constitution lacks a due process
clause. 48 Instead, Oregon courts have chosen to apply only the per se "denial of
all economically viable use ' '49 rule to decide takings cases. Under that
standard, landowners' regulatory takings claims can succeed only if the
challenged land use regulation completely diminishes their property's value.
Because the Oregon standard is so high, the state courts have held few land use
decisions to constitute takings. 5 1 Accordingly, landowners receive little
protection from courts considering their takings claims.
3. Invalidation of Measure 7
A third contentious area involves the courts' invalidation of a 2000 ballot
measure, Measure 7. The measure would have amended the takings clause of
the state constitution 52 to protect landowners from regulatory takings. Measure
7 resembled Measure 37 in many ways. 53 It would have required the
government to compensate the landowner whenever a land use regulation
"ha[d] the effect of reducing the value of a property upon which the restriction
55
is imposed., 54 Oregon voters adopted the amendment in November 2000.
47. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 855 P.2d. 608, 615 n.14 (Or. 1993) (stating that the "dictum in
Lucas [incorporating the Penn Central factors] went far beyond what the majority opinion in that case
needed to say to decide the issues presented"); id. at 615 ("This court has never held that investmentbacked expectations are part of any Article I, section 18, taking analysis."); see also Tara J. Schleicher,
Comment, A Tale of Two Courts: Differences Between Oregon's Approach and the United States
Supreme Court's Approach to Fifth Amendment Takings Claims, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 817, 847
(1995) (noting that "Oregon's refusal to use the Penn Central factors may be partly in response to its
unique land-use planning system").
48. See Schleicher, supra note 47, at 832.
49. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
50. See, e.g., League of Oregon Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892, 906 (Or. 2002) ("Article I, section 18,
currently requires payment of just compensation only when a property owner demonstrates that a
governmental regulation has deprive[d] the owner of all economically viable use of the property. If the
owner has some substantial beneficial use of the property remaining, then the owner fails to meet the
test.") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dodd, 855 P.2d at 614-15 (using the
Lucas test on denial of all economically viable use to deny the existence of a taking); Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-59 (Or. 1993) (applying Lucas to find no taking where owners of
oceanfront lots had been denied a permit to build a seawall).
51. See, e.g., Multnomah County v. Howell, 496 P.2d 235, 238 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (holding "a
zoning ordinance is not ... unconstitutional merely because it operates to reduce the value of the
property or restrict its use to less than its most profitable use ... [or because the property] may have
greater value if otherwise zoned"). But see Coast Range Conifers v. State, 76 P.3d 1148, 1158 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that the state agency's refisal to allow logging on landowner's nine-acre parcel
violated the state's takings clause because the restriction deprived landowner of all economically viable
use), affd on reh "g, 83 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
52. OR. CONST. art. I, § 18.
53. There are two important differences between Measure 7 and Measure 37: 1) Measure 7
proposed a constitutional amendment, whereas Measure 37 proposed a new statute; and 2) Measure 37
includes a provision allowing the government to forgo enforcement, whereas Measure 7 did not.
54. Measure
7
(Or.
2000),
in
ONLINE
VOTERS'
GUIDE
(2000),
at
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/guide/mea/m7/m7.htm (revised Feb. 2, 2001); cf. Peter
Livingston, Measure 7 and PropertyRights: Pretty Simple? Pretty Fair?,61 OR. STATE BAR BULL. 9, 9
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However, the Oregon Supreme Court subsequently voided Measure 7 for
violating the state's "separate vote" requirement. 56 State law requires that each
amendment to the state constitution be voted on separately 57 if such
amendments are "substantive and... not closely related. ' 58 The Oregon
Supreme Court found the measure invalid because Measure 7 failed to
separately present for a vote
the two constitutional changes, to takings and free
59
expression, it would enact.
The Court's decision to void Measure 7 agitated and galvanized the
property-rights coalition, which argued that court's ruling subverted the will of
the people. 60 Measure 7 supporters gave the legislature a final chance to enact a
more measured compensation statute. 6 1 Recent legislative efforts toward that
goal gave them hope, 62 but the legislature failed63 to formulate a new
compensation statute after Measure 7 was struck down.

(June 2001) (arguing that "when it comes to defending property rights, Measure 7 is to the Fifth
Amendment what a machine gun is to a musket").
55. See League of Oregon Cities, 56 P.3d at 896 (noting that "voters appear to have approved
Measure 7" even before canvassing all of the votes was completed). Official results are not available due
to a court order stopping the vote count. See Elections Div., Office of the Sec'y of State (Or.), Official
Results,
November
7,
2000
General
Election,
at
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/other.info/result.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
56. League of Oregon Cities, 56 P.3d at 909-11 (holding that the initiative substantially amended
both the takings and free expression provisions of Oregon's state constitution, and that because those
amendments were not closely related the initiative violated the separate-vote requirement).
57. See OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 ("When two or more amendments shall be submitted ... to the
voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted
on separately.").
58. Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 64 (Or. 1998) (stating that "the proper inquiry is to
determine whether, if adopted, the proposal would make two or more changes to the constitution that are
substantive and that are not closely related").
59. League of Oregon Cities, 56 P.3d at 909-11. Note that the free expression component of the
landowner's claim related to subsection (c) of Measure 37, which permitted governments not to pay just
compensation if the challenged regulation prohibited, among other uses, selling pornography. Id. at 90708.
60. See, e.g., Oregonians in Action, Oregon Supreme Court InvalidatesMeasure 7 and Overturns
Will of People, http://oia.org/Measure7UpdateOct2002.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
61. See Cordes, supra note 38, at 226 (stating that it is "precisely because the judicial takings
standard fails to provide the level of protection sought by property rights groups that they have resorted
to the legislative arena" (emphasis added)).
62. In 1995, the legislature had attempted to enact a compensation statute that would have required
that government compensate landowners if the value of their land was diminished by more than ten
percent as a result of environmental regulations. However, the bill was vetoed by then-Governor
Kitzhaber, who took pride in his radical approach to environmental stewardship. Governor Kitzhaber
remained in office until 2003, probably deterring legislators from proposing another compensation
statute. See Jeff Mapes, Kitzhaber Chops Down "Ecotake'"Bill, OREGONIAN, July 14, 1995, at Dl
(describing property rights groups' negative reactions to his veto); see also David Steves, Oregon
Governor Nears Veto Record, REG.-GuARD, Aug. 19, 1999 (observing that Governor Kitzhaber vetoed
dozens on bills in 1999, including a number of bills that he perceived to threaten Oregon's land use
system).
63. See Deborah Howe et al., What's on the Horizon for Oregon's Planners?, 70 J. AM. PLAN.
ASs'N 391 (2004).

Oregon's Measure 37
II.

How

FAR THE THIRD ACTOR MAY SHIFT THE BALANCE

Oregon's land use system failed to provide citizens with an adequate level
of protection from regulatory takings, primarily because both the legislature
and the courts went too far in developing Oregon's land use system without
providing adequate remedies for aggrieved landowners. After a long history of
cooperation, the public and government became misaligned, and their attitude
toward each other adversarial. Citizens' frustration solidified into broad support
for radical action: Measure 37. By enacting Measure 37, Oregonians used the
ballot initiative to cement their position as a significant counterbalance to the
legislature and the courts. However, the dramatic substantive changes proposed
by Measure 37 raise a new, important question: how far did the public go in
tilting the balance?
A.

The ThirdActor As a Counterweight

For many years, the public and the two institutional actors shared a
common goal-protection of their environmental resources-and a preferred
method for achieving that goal. However, in part due to a shift in the cultural
and political climate, the public and government drifted apart. As a result, the
public has become a significant counterweight to the actions (or inaction) of the
legislature and the courts.
In the early days after the passage of SB 100, the public strongly supported

the expansion of the land use system and the development of comprehensive
planning. In 1976, 1978, and 1982, Oregon voters-including many
conservative groups-rejected anti-planning initiatives by margins of ten to
twenty percent. 64 Well into the mid-1980s, Oregonians were optimistic about

planning and united in preserving
the natural resources that comprised the
65
state's main economic base.

64. 1000 Friends of Oregon, Overview and Accomplishments of the Oregon and Metro Portland
Planning Programs, at http://www.friends.org/resources/planaccomp.html (Sept. 1998); see Elections
Div., Office of the Sec'y of State (Or.), Initiative, Referendum and Recall 1972-1978, in THE OREGON
BLUEBOOK, http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/electionsl9.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (noting
the results of Measure 10, "Repeals Land Use Planning Coordination Statutes," which in 1976 was
defeated by a margin of 402,608 to 536,502, and another Measure 10, "Land Use Planning, Zoning
Constitutional Amendment," which in 1978 was defeated by a margin of 334,523 to 515,138); Elections
Div., Office of the Sec'y of State (Or.), Initiative, Referendum and Recall 1980-1987, in id.,
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections20.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (noting the results
of Measure 6, "Ends State's Land Use Planning Powers, Retains Local Planning," which in 1982 was
defeated by a margin of 461,271 to 565,056); see also Liberty, supra note 12, at 368 (noting that in the
mid-1990s, "when conservatives gained control of both houses of the Oregon legislature, other,
traditionally conservative organizations, most notably the Oregon Farm Bureau Federation and the
Oregon Forest Industry Council, rallied to the defense of the planning program when it was under
attack").
65. See Sullivan, supra note 34, at 846 (stating that Oregon is unique "in the homogeneity of its
population; its political and social traditions; the extensive use it has made of the initiative, referendum,
and recall; and the concern it has for protecting agricultural and forestry resources, the economic base of
the state").

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 23:587, 2005

To a certain extent, the current misalignment resulted from unmanageable
forces. Over time, a shifting economy and population growth changed the
public mindset. The economy no longer relies primarily on natural resources,
so one of the government's primary goals in land use planning-protecting
forests and mining land-is outmoded. The Oregon population has grown
substantially since 1973, rendering many regulations, like the urban growth
boundaries, unduly restrictive. 66 Moreover, many Oregonians today were not
around in the early 1970s when SB 100 and other statewide planning legislation
developed. One commentator questions whether newcomers and
young people
67
can grasp the importance of Oregon's unique land use system.
The significant changes help explain why the image of Oregon as a bastion
of left-leaning thinkers, 68 tolerant of planners' intrusions, is outdated. Few
should have been surprised that Measure 37 passed in 2004. Besides supporting
Measure 37, Oregonians voted against Measure 34, which would have
preserved certain state forests. 69 This may further indicate a subtle shift toward
property rights and less governmental regulation in the formerly liberal state.
Ballot initiatives like Measures 7 and 37 have addressed this new political
70
reality better than either the legislature or the courts.
B.

How FarDoes Measure 37 Go?

Measure 37 could have radical effects. Proponents believe that the law will
encourage local governments to "achieve their objectives through owner
incentives and education efforts, not the iron fist of regulation." 71 They also
hope that Measure 37 will make the land use system more fair by ensuring that
landowners are better protected from government's infringements.

66. Between 1990 and 2000 alone, Oregon's population grew by 20.4 percent. U.S. Census Bureau,
Oregon QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41000.html (last revised Feb. 1, 2005).
67. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 843 (stating that "[p]eople who move to Oregon or who are
coming of age simply do not remember the history and reasons we had for putting so much blood and
treasure into our land use program").
68. See Jeff Kosseff, Oregon Voters' Recent Defeat of Tax Measure Inspires Antitax Activists,
OREGONIAN, Feb. 7, 2004, at Al; (discussing Oregonians' perceived liberalness in the context of their
failure to pass a tax increase); Susannah Rosenblatt, The Race to the White House: Oregon PrimaryMay
be Last Standfor Kucinich, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at A20 (describing "Oregon, whose Democratic
voters often display a strong liberal bent").
69. See OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 26-28; Elections Div., Office of the Sec'y of
State (Or.), November 2, 2004, General Election Abstract of Votes: State Measure 34, at
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m34.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
70. See generally Hans Linde, Practicing Theory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative Lawmaking, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1735 (1998) (offering a theory under constitutional law for accommodating lawmaking
by public initiative).
71. Dave Hunnicutt, In My Opinion the Sky Is Not Falling Under Measure 37, OREGONIAN, Nov.
24, 2004, at C9. In Oregon, citizens may print arguments in the state voters' pamphlet either favoring or
opposing ballot measures by purchasing space for $500 or by submitting 1,000 signatures. OREGON
VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 3. In this election, dozens of arguments were filed for each side.
See id.
at 105-18 (arguments in favor); id.at 119-32 (arguments in opposition).

Oregon's Measure 37
Critics charge that Measure 37 threatens not only to undermine all of
Oregon's land use protections, but also to bankrupt local governments in the
process.72 One commentator has suggested that what "got lost in the debate ...
was the land" itself: the delicate ecologies which, if mismanaged, can cause
entire societies to fail.73 Some may worry that other states, several of which
have adopted Oregon's approach to statewide land use planning, will begin
rolling back their own land use protections. 74 A true comparative analysis is
beyond the scope of this Comment, but there are indications that groups in
other states may copy the strategies of the measure's backers in their own
efforts to strengthen property rights.75 Finally, commenting on the financial
implications of a rule similar to Measure 37, the Supreme Court has famously
said that "Government could hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Just evaluating landowners' claims-not including
any payouts-is expected to cost Oregon's state and local governments
between $64 and $344 million per year. 76 The cost of payouts cannot yet be
estimated and will depend on the way state and local governments enforce the
new law.

For their part, representatives of local governments are viewing the law as
"'the ultimate Catch-22.' '77 Each local government must craft its own

application process for resolving Measure 37 claims. If local governments
formulate an overly complex application process for regulatory takings claims,
they will undermine the spirit of the public mandate. But to take an "anything
goes" attitude toward claims could result in a deluge of litigation that would
damage the land use system that Oregonians have fought for decades to protect

72. Measure 37 was strenuously opposed by historic preservation, conservation, and communitybased groups. See 1000 Friends of Oregon, Partial List of Organizations Opposed to Measure 37, at
http://www.friends.org/issues/documents/M37endorsed.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
73. Malcolm Gladwell, The Vanishing, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 70, 73 (reviewing JARED
DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005)). Gladwell discusses

Measure 37 in light of Collapse because the book historically demonstrates how societies have
historically "fail[ed] ...when they mismanage[d] ... environmental factors." Id.at 70.

74. See Schleicher, supra note 47, at 826 n.81 (listing the efforts of Maryland, California, Maine,
Rhode Island, Virginia, Florida, and Vermont) (citing Robert L. Liberty, Oregon's Comprehensive
Growth Management Program:An Implementation Review for OtherStates, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367,
10368 n.2 (1992)); see also James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The New
Emerging Modelfor State Management Statutes, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 489, 490-91 (1994) (noting
that with Oregon's example, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington passed
new planning laws, and Florida and Vermont amended existing laws substantially).
75. See Payingfor Property, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at A18 (suggesting that Measure 37 is a
"precedent that could spread to other states").
76. See OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supranote 2, at 103 (estimating the financial impact on state
administrative expenditures to be between $18 and $44 million per year, with local government
expenditures estimated at $46 and $300 million).
77. Laura Oppenheimer, Oregon Cities Mount Defenses Against Voter-Passed Property Rights
Law, OREGONIAN, Nov. 28, 2004 (quoting Eugene mayor Jim Torrey).
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CONCLUSION

By passing Measure 37, Oregonians demonstrated that, at least in the
context of regulatory takings, government had gone too far. Voters were
frustrated by the ever-expanding regulatory system, the courts' incoherent
takings law, and thwarted attempts (like Measure 7) to protect their property
rights. As a last resort, they chose to clarify their role as a collective third actor
through the dramatic measure of a ballot initiative.
While it remains unclear whether Measure 37 will have ripple effects in
other states, it has the potential to work a radical change on Oregon's land use
system. Planners and politicians fimally recognize that Oregonians value
individual property rights and that they "can no longer rely on regulations to
mold the type of communities they want." 79 Measure 37 has served as a wakeup call to legislators, judges, and land use officials to clarify and streamline
existing law, lest the people take the law in their own hands and-as they may
have done in Oregon-"go too far" themselves.

78. But see Robert Liberty, Planned Growth: The Oregon Model, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
315 (1998) (commenting that when the legislature created the LUBA, a wave of litigation was
expected-but land use claims actually constitute less than one percent of all appealable decisions).
79. Laura Oppenheimer, Land Use Laws on Turf That Is Uncharted,OREGONIAN, Nov. 4, 2004, at
Al.

